Executive Summary

I. Overview
The end state of stability in Iraq and the greater Middle East has eluded our efforts. Attempts to ‘set conditions’ for democracy have failed.

II. Opportunity
All sectors of life in Iraq are in turmoil. Politicians can’t mass power to effect change, efforts by voters to contribute are hampered by the dilution of votes over more than thirty political parties, businesses compete in an unfair (unevenly regulated) environment, old grievances are aired violently, and municipal and governorate authorities are powerless in the face of a faceless and changing set of violent actors. Iraq has re-defined the US military’s concept of civil war, forcing the most powerful military on Earth to live behind fortified walls, rendering it ineffective. Public recognition of our mistakes coupled with an equally public announcement of a dramatic shift in thinking creates the potential for a political windfall for all stakeholders, fueling a positive outcome. The previous mid-level Iraqi technocrats are well positioned to leverage our past efforts. Empowering and catalyzing that group sets up a win-win situation.


III. Solution

Mid to senior level leaders and workers of the previous regime’s political parties are re-legitimized, mandated, funded and controlled through current Coalition assets in Iraq and through foreign service and other means. By publicly admitting failure and at the same time calling on the members of the past regime’s political machine, the Coalition allows an Iraqi solution to an Iraqi problem and dramatically shifts public focus away from religion and onto politics. The US instantly becomes an enabler instead of prime mover, stepping out of the arena of blame and onto higher moral ground. Polarity is restored and both poles are Iraqi, not international.


VI. Political Impact Summary

This course of action assumes the existence of a critical mass of disaffected members of the past Iraqi political regime. Refocusing their energies away from the current situation reduces dissent and its attendant manifestations. Legitimizing this group sends a strong and clear message to the Iraqi people and other actors in and out of Iraq that it is no longer business as usual, and indicates a level of ‘savvy’ instantly recognizable by the Arab community at large. Key to this course of action is a constant public and private dialogue with the Kurdish community and a clear limit on the accumulation of power, economic, social or military, by the re-energized players. These control measures might best be enforced through martial law, obeying the recognized precept of Unity of Command.