CI Theory and Stability Operations

COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE THEORY

AND

TRANSITIONAL INTERAGENCY STABILITY OPERATIONS

IN

AFGHANISTAN

MAJ Tom Kinton

415^th CA BN

S9, PRT Khost, Afghanistan

May 2011

For if a true survey be taken of counselors and statesmen, there may be found (though rarely) those which can make a small state great, and yet cannot fiddle; as on the other side, there will be found a great many that can fiddle very cunningly, but yet are so far from being able to make a small state great, as their gift lieth the other way; to bring a great and flourishing estate to ruin and decay.  (Bacon)

In echoing the words attributed to Themistocles, Sir Francis Bacon gives voice to what many have felt intuitively but have not been able to articulate.  Stability operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan have enjoyed costly and limited success.  Coalition presence (uniformed and otherwise) offers targets of opportunity to insurgent forces.  Strong interpersonal relationships (the enablers of trust with indigenous populations and institutions) are mitigated by civilian and military personnel’s rotation in and out of theater.   Public support of substantial continuation of U.S. military efforts in both theatres has been on the wane for some time, giving momentum to the current administration’s desire for a timely exit. 

Despite the billions of dollars, millions of man-hours, and thousands of lives lost, Iraq and Afghanistan remain seemingly intractable issues.  Insurgent information operations (IO), more widely recognized as marketing, routinely reach a far wider audience and with a much greater ‘stickiness’ than Coalition IO efforts.  Western public perception is that fat-cat contractors, pompous and petulant government officials and rough-edged military participants slow the process of stabilization instead of speeding it along.  The Arab Street in general reacts to Coalition presence in both theatres as bumbling, deadly, heretical meddling.  The situation could realistically be described as bleak.  The casual observer might well conclude, as did Pogo, that we have met the enemy, and they are us.

Are they?  Writing on the theory of Complex Interdependence (CI), Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye posit that ‘military force is not used by governments towards other governments within the region (of cooperation), or on the issues, when complex interdependence prevails’ (Keohane and Nye).  Taken further, with the decline of military presence, states will move toward other forms of interdependence.  Additionally, the absence of military action creates space, increasing state and institutional cooperation.  Seen inversely, military presence can potentially hinder interdependence and cooperation.  Several questions flow from these statements:

·      Can a deeper understanding of CI theory support our national interest of reducing threats to stability in Afghanistan?

·      What is the role of promoting democracy in politically instable regions?

·      How can interagency and coalition actors responsibly disengage from stability operations?

·      Can a ‘cooperative region’ be developed through external efforts or must it occur naturally?

The thesis of this effort is that Complex Interdependence Theory (CI) can be used as a lens through which to focus interagency transitional energies to create conditions that support the autonomization of the Indigenous Populations and Institutions (IPI); expressed in two words: responsible disengagement.  Nowhere is this desire more clearly articulated than the words of a recent USG report on stability in Afghanistan:

Our strategy moving forward is to achieve our objectives through three core elements: a military effort to create the conditions for a transition, a civilian surge that reinforces positive action, and an effective partnership with Pakistan. (U.S. Department of Defense)

Here we see the essence of complex interdependence:  military involvement in the civilian sector (creating conditions), multiple actors with differing agendas (the civilian surge), and regional/neighbor-state involvement. 

This paper addresses the questions in groupings of three areas:

·      The theory of complex interdependence

·      Application of the theory to the current operational environment

·      The transitional challenges of harmonizing military and political efforts towards responsible disengagement

The Theory of Complex Interdependence

Keohane and Nye parse CI into three sections: multiple channels of communication, absence of hierarchy among issues, and the minor role of military force.  As a lens through which to view the United States’ involvement in Afghanistan the three parts of the CI kaleidoscope are familiar.  All three bear closer examination.

Multiple Channels

Military jargon lends itself to the description of multiple channels.  Strategic, operational and tactical channels are many.  On another plane, diplomatic, informational and economic avenues enable a further widening of contact between opposing entities.  Taken together these six channels of contact produce nine possible combinations impacting the outcome of any decision.  The number of individual actors involved with each decision deepens these nine channels.  If only three actors are involved within each of the nine channels the result is twenty-seven possible levels of variance for each decision.  But the equation is not finished: there is a mirror-set of variables on the other side of the issue under consideration and, in the case of Afghanistan, usually a second language and the accompanying translation issues. 

Even the most minimalist application of this method results in seven hundred twenty-nine variances of impact on one issue.  Said another way, on any particular issue between two opposing sides, given three levels of action and three areas of focus (strategic, operational and tactical; diplomatic, informational and economic), there are seven hundred and twenty-nine possible points of misunderstanding.  Multiple channels, then, have the potential to impart friction to the decision-making process.  But multiple channels are only one-third of the theory of Complex Interdependence. 

Absence of Hierarchy Among Issues

Legacy organizations like the Department of Defense possess doctrinal operational structure.  Competing agendas and non-state actors, absent any organizing principle, are more fluid.  By its very nature the Department of Defense is currently engaged in an asymmetric fight with not only enemies of state but also an ever-expanding group of not-quite-enemy-but-not-quite-friendly fellow travelers.  This is not to say that other agencies and NGOs do not possess structure; far from it.  But to speak of DoD and an NGO as having the same level of structural ‘discipline’ is to do a disservice to both organizations. 

Keohane and Nye’s observation is that in a complex environment (such as interagency/coalition efforts in Afghanistan) there is not any one organizing principle under which all parties (the licit ones) unite.  The temptation to deconstruct this third of the triad is great: one could argue that the Millennium Development Goals are the unifying principle (The United Nations), or that the U.S. Department of State wraps up Afghan goals within the fascia of policy exported from Washington (U.S. Department of State).  Or, perhaps, the Taliban provides another source for the way forward for the people of Afghanistan.

Although operating illicitly, the opposition Taliban actors certainly qualify as possessing their own set of issues, along with an agenda, which do not coincide with other parties’ issues or anticipated outcomes. So from only one point of view there are organizing principles, issues and agendas.  The trouble is, the organizing principles are disparate and, to date, not reconcilable.  It is this lack of a central organizing principle that allows disparate issues to flourish and receive inordinate attention, drawing resources away from otherwise central issues.

The Minor Role of Military Force

States belonging to supra-statal organizations tend to use military force less often than states outside the group (Keohane and Nye).  Conversely, those states outside the aegis of supra-statal membership are more inclined towards forceful coercion.  Examples of cooperative diplomatic, economic and political organizations range from the Roman Empire to NATO, the USSR and NAFTA.  Although disagreement over the morality of state behavior may give pause to some, Niccoló would probably just smile knowingly.  His advice to princes reinforces the control measures employed by both states:

‘…love (of the prince) is preserved by the link of obligation which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which never fails’ (Machiavelli Ch. 17)

The four examples in the earlier paragraph are prime examples of supra-statal organizations reducing intra-member forceful coercion, and can be seen as an evolution.  Rome, with its territorial expansion, unified disparate states under its military force, or threat of force, to be sure.  The more insidious and enduring unifiers of Roman rule are the same shared by NATO, the USSR and trade/treaty groups like the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, namely, standards. 

Standards of trade such as weights, measures and coinage are one variety.  Legal, moral and ethical codes are another.   On their own these sticks in the bundle are weak; sheathed in the fascia of state power such as Rome the bundle of sticks becomes formidably strong.  Newly conquered states under Roman rule faced a choice:  conform and adhere to the standards or face the Legion’s fist and phalanx.  Conformity, over time, led to greater prosperity for the conquered states and eventual assimilation.  Rome’s standards, enforced through the constant presence of military garrisons, served as a supra-statal framework.  Although technically part of the Roman Empire, conquered states continued to find their own way along the various parts of existence, including social, linguistic, and cultural, to name a few. 

But a newly acquired state’s assimilation was influenced far more deeply by two significant and often under-valued conditions:  Rome’s longevity of rule, and the intermarriage of Roman soldiers with the local populace.  Here we see a lesson in stability operations that is less-than-well received by modernity:  stability operations take serious, multi-generational effort in terms of time and resources.  Further, serious deviations from Rome’s example abound with regard to military operations in Afghanistan.  Among these are doctrines of extreme tolerance for religious and cultural aberrations that are anathema to stability, over-sensitivity to the use of force, amateur efforts at perception management/marketing clothed in the oft-misunderstood mantle of Information Operations (IO), and counterproductive and doting efforts to appreciate local language and practice. 

Attempting to learn Pashto for a nine-month rotation is a stretch, when local actors have a nine or ten-year head start on English as a second language.  Other examples of this type of operational friction are doubtless familiar to the audience, and they could be addressed through a more martial strategic and operational mindset.  These examples of the supra-statal military organization attempting to conform operations to local codes, mores and customs are exactly what CI theory says is wrong with excessive military involvement with regard to stability operations.  Again, we hear Machiavelli’s words across the centuries:

For it must be noted that men must either be caressed or else destroyed, because they will revenge themselves for small injuries, but cannot do so for serious ones.  This, the injury done to a man must be such that there is no need to fear his vengeance.  But by keeping troops there instead of colonists, one will spend a great deal more, being obliged to consume all the revenues of the state in order to guard it, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and much greater harm is done, since the entire state is injured by the army’s having to move its quarters from place to place.  This inconvenience is felt by all, and everyone becomes an enemy, and these are enemies who can do harm, because, though beaten, they remain in their own homes.  In every way, then, a garrison is as useless as colonies are useful.  (Machiavelli 12) (Italics added)

There can be no half-hearted measures in combat.  At the risk of blaspheming current doctrine, we are COIN-ing ourselves to death.

Rome’s longevity and the short-lived tenure of the Soviet Union provide us with bookends here.  The force of Roman economic, diplomatic and political efforts provided conquered territories with attractive supra-statal organizing principles.  On the other end of the bookshelf the Soviet model looked to the now-discredited Hegelian dialectic, in a vain effort to sacrifice the good (long-term stability at nominal cost) in favor of the perfect (synthesis).

Application of CI Theory to the Afghan Operational Environment

Distance, both physical and cultural, reduces the quality of the image and information sought.  A neighbor of the same religion and language family far better appreciates Afghanistan’s issues than an observer 9,000 miles away; the finer distinctions are only appreciated through proximity and affinity, leading to understanding.  Keohane and Nye recognize this when they say ‘States belonging to supra-statal organizations tend to use military force less often than states outside the group’ (ibid).  And these supra-statal organizations tend to be characterized by the commonalities of region, language, culture and religion.  These commonalities drive sustainable agenda setting, engendering regional stability. 

Agenda setting in Afghanistan is affected by local, regional, national, multinational and NGO (non-governmental organization) actors.  These actors are (or are-not) subordinate to various supra-statal entities such as the World Bank, the United Nations and NATO. The multiplicity of actors, agendas, languages and cultures creates a corporate cognitive dissonance as pervasive as to go unnoticed; dissonance is taken as the norm. 

In this dissonant environment, issues rise and fall on the strength the voice, and not always a certain logic of argument.  The quantity of actors and their oft-times competing agendas further reduces efficacy.  Although certainly not all-inclusive, a short list of actors on the Afghan stability stage includes the United States Departments of State, Defense, Agriculture and Homeland Security, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and several intelligence organizations.  International actors include the NATO member states and their various military and non-military organs, the United Nations and its several embodiments, and a plethora of non-governmental organizations addressing a variety of needs. And this list is exclusive of the fractured and fractious Afghan socio-political reality. 

By and large these actors espouse cooperation, but to ask the Afghan government for any sort of ‘followership’ given the large number of outside influencers is to willingly suspend disbelief.  Given this set of multiple actors, competing agendas and external military force, any hope for a cogent, national, agreed-upon response from the Afghan people is unrealistic.  There are, quite simply, too many sidebar conversations on the stage for the drama to reach a substantive conclusion. 

Afghan Conditions and Societal Collapse

Moreover, states that spring up quickly, like all other things in nature which, after being born, grow rapidly, cannot develop roots and all their branchings, so that the first bad weather destroys them, unless, as has been said, those who have become princes have such great ability (virtue) that they are able straightway to prepare themselves to preserve what Fortune has throw in their laps and afterward to lay those foundations that others made before becoming princes.  (Machiavelli 28)

Jared Diamond’s work[1] on why societies weaken and fail is instructive (Diamond).  In his research, Diamond identifies five key parts of a framework on the topic of societal death.  Although certainly not dead, current conditions in Afghanistan fit neatly into his model of societal decline:

1.     Human impacts on the environment

2.     Climate change

3.     Relations with neighboring friendly societies

4.     Relations with hostile societies

5.     Political, economic, social and cultural factors

As a result of the confluence of these five variables, Diamond holds that societies (the Maya in Mexico and Central America and the USSR, to name two) rapidly collapse after a societal peak.  This rapid collapse, he holds, occurs at the point of a mismatch between available resources and resource consumption.  He recommends that the observer of current unstable conditions (in an observed society such as Afghanistan) should not be looking the value of the resources or population of the society (the mathematical function), but at the first and second derivatives of it. The real trouble occurs further along, at the point of the mismatch between needs and resources.  For stability to self-sustain, planners and practitioners must look farther ahead.

International involvement in Afghanistan runs wide and deep: ten years from 2001 to date and contributions in excess of 2/3rds of the Afghan budget.[2]  The mismatch, then, between available resources (external assistance) and needs (increasing birth rates and lowered rates of infant mortality) becomes clear:  at some point in the future there will be a reckoning of accounts in Afghanistan and the populace will suffer out of proportion to it’s baseline existence pre-2001.  Why, then, doesn’t Afghan society realize this and make course corrections?

Diamond asked the same question: Why do these societies fail to solve their own problems? His answers resonate with CI theory and Afghan society in particular:

·      In societies where there is a conflict of interest of the decision making elites and the society as a whole, especially when the elites are insulated from the consequences of those decisions, the elites are allowed to advance their own self-interests more easily (centralized government and a culture of patronage and nepotism)

·      It is particularly hard for societies to make good decisions where there is a conflict involving strongly held values that are good in many circumstances but are poor in others, specifically where there is a shared commitment to religion and social cohesion (the theocratic nature of Islam and the strong tribal unit)

·      He further points out the difficulty in making course changes where the things that get you in trouble are also the source of your strength

If we can agree that the above is valid, we certainly must consider the second and third order effects of stability operations in Afghanistan and re-evaluate and perhaps re-prioritize our efforts.  In order to chart the course to Afghan stability, here is a brief look at the how the current Lines of Effort[3] relate with Professor Diamond’s framework:

Note: lines represent first order connections; data are subjective. 

Oft quoted and equally often used to guide civil military operations, Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is superimposed here over the previous graphic.

This graphic represents the focus in Afghanistan as it relates to Maslow’s hierarchy and the coalition lines of effort.  What it reveals is the inequity between effort spent on Agriculture, Security and Negative Influencers, and the realization of greater self-sustainment through a hybridization of Diamond’s five areas and established lines of effort. 

Although not available at the time of publication, a data set showing coalition spending to include the real cost of DoD lethal operations on negative influencers and security would be revealing.  This chart is offered as a starting point for future discussion.  The utility of such a study could lead to a re-prioritization of efforts as they apply to long-term sustainability, as opposed to the moving target of stability.

Can a deeper understanding of CI theory support our national interests of reducing threats to stability in Afghanistan?

The temptation to idealize one theory over another is as great here as it was for the Soviets vis-à-vis the Hegelian dialectic.  CI theory is only one way to make sense of events, and does not replace the Realist view.  Power brokers and observers are tempted to apply Realism to Afghanistan and they would not be entirely wrong. 

 Realism holds that in an anarchic world, power is the most sought-after commodity and, in some sense, the view is not incorrect. The difference here is that with the rise of multiple actors and their competing agendas anarchy is reduced, and those actors and agendas create dissonance and produce friction in much greater volume than in the past. Instantaneous communication of events also conveys views and opinions that drive change in those agendas at a pace often too quick to address by conventional (legacy/military) systems.  The friction of agenda change is leveraged by the multiplicity of agenda-setters, creating conditions for multiple and changing end states or goals. 

Lastly, the span of time from 2001 (the beginning of the most recent intervention in Afghanistan) and current operations in some ways holds practitioners hostage to their own recent past.  This long time-span engenders in some the tendency to view our intervention in Afghanistan as ‘normal’, contributing to resistance to change.  Nowhere is this more clearly demonstrated than in the use of money as a weapons system (MAAWS).  The concept, begun in previous conflict and formalized in Iraq in 2006-2009 holds that injecting capital (and its concomitant capital improvements) serves as an efficient adjunct to lethal operations. 

The combination of over a decade of good intentions in Afghanistan, coupled with the bandwagon mentality of U.S. military officers and congressmen has solidified the MAAWS doctrine at the ground level through the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP).[4]   Through the CERP program, governed by MAAWS, battle space owner’s and PRT’s leverage their proximity and affinity for local conditions into significant gains in governance, development and other lines of effort.  The ability to quickly address pressing needs based on an understanding of current conditions produces measureable results on local conditions.  CERP and the MAAWS doctrine are a critical part of Complex Interdependence, but their continued success is critically dependent on external inputs of cash.

Realism vs. Complex Interdependence

The tendency to dismiss the value of CI theory by associating it with Realism is seductive.  Realism and it’s doppelganger, Realpolitik, views events and behaviors as power-based;[5] CI theory acknowledges that power and refines it, identifying other players and acknowledging their role as increasingly empowered influencers.  Realism looks at the system and, in the parlance of our time, says, ‘it is what it is’.  Liberalism looks at the system and says, ‘it should be what it could be’; CI theory expands the view and gains granularity, acknowledging previously ignored outliers.  Keohane and Nye broke ground on this distinction forty years ago, and showed us the distinction in this simple format:

                                    Realism                                    Complex Interdependence

Goals of Actors                                    Military security will be                                     Goals of states will vary by issue area.  Transgovern-

                                                      dominant goal.                                                      mental politics will make goals difficult to define. 

                                                                                                                              Transnational actors will pursue their own goals.

Instruments of State Policy                  Military force will be most                                    Power resources specific to issue areas will be most

                                                      effective, although economic                                    relevant.  Manipulation of interdependence, inter-

                                                      and other instruments will                                    national organizations, and transnational actors

                                                      be used.                                                                        will be major instruments.

Agenda formation                                    Potential shifts in the balance                                    Agenda will be affected by changes in the

                                                      of power and security threats                                    distribution of power resources within issue

                                                      will set the agenda in high                                    areas; the status of international regimes;

                                                      politics, and will strongly                                     changes in the importance of transnational

                                                      influence other agendas.                                    actors; linkages from other issues and

                                                                                                                              politicization as a result of rising sensitivity

                                                                                                                              interdependence.

Linkages of Issues                                    Linkages will reduce differences                                    Linkages by strong states will be more difficult to

                                                      In outcomes among issue areas                                    make since force will be ineffective.  Linkages by

                                                      reinforcing international                                     weak states through international organizations will

                                                      hierarchy.                                                                        erode rather than reinforce hierarchy.

Roles of international                                     Roles are minor, limited by                                    Organizations will set agendas, induce coalitions and organizations                                    the importance of military force                                    act as arenas for political action by weak states. 

                                                                                                                              Ability to choose the organizational forum for an

                                                                                                                              issue and to mobilize votes will be an important

                                                                                                                              political resource. (Keohane and Nye)

                                   

Complex interdependence theory does not replace realism; in fact, Mearsheimer’s five assumptions of the international system are apropos to Afghanistan:

…1) states are the key actors in world politics and they operate in an anarchic system, 2) great powers invariably have some offensive military capability, 3) states can never be certain whether other states have hostile intentions toward them, 4) great powers place a high premium on survival, and 5) states are rational actors who are reasonably effective at designing strategies that maximize their chances of survival.(Mearsheimer 363-363)

Applying this set of assumptions to Afghanistan merely requires one to replace the word ‘states’ with ‘Afghans’ and ‘great powers’ with ‘tribes’.  Were Afghanistan to be left to its own devices, absent external (extra-regional) influence, power politics would play out according to Realist theory.  There are, however, other actors involved in Afghanistan, and they bring another set of assumptions (and friction) to the problem set.  CI theory begins with Realism and acknowledges the impact and friction of these extra-regional actors and their assumptions.

Legacy (Realist) Assumptions in Stability Operations

‘You go to war with the assumptions you’ve got’.[6]  Organizational skills and institutional memory are only as deep and wide as the experience of their members’.  Casual observation of DoS, DoD and interagency activities reveals basic assumptions with regard to stability operations:

·      The military is the best game in town

·      Interagency involvement will remain flat or grow slowly[7]

·      Military involvement will remain flat or decline slowly

·      Threats to stability operations practitioners will fluctuate for several reasons

o   Efficacy of threat operations

o   Efficacy of threat disrupt/deter/deny operations

·      Availability of resources to both parties:

o   Cash

o   Human capital

o   Political support

Although beyond the scope of this paper, the assumptions listed here are easily recognized as legacy, organizational and insulated from the realities of the political and cultural situation in Afghanistan.  The first, that ‘the military is the best game in town’, is a misstatement; better said, at present, the military is the ‘only’ game in town. [8] 

Increasing interagency presence in Afghanistan might be a reality on the large bases like Baghram, Kabul and Kandahar, but the hinterlands suffer from a dearth of talented DoS staffing (Kinder).  Coupled with recent funding constraints,[9] the inadequate staffing of stability practitioners denies battle space owners the coin of COIN.[10]

Application of CI to Afghanistan/COIN

In the following section I address some of the issues surrounding COIN as practiced in Afghanistan: stability operations as an extracted resource, money as a weapons system, functional corruption, and the role of Pakistan and India vis-à-vis United States foreign policy in the region. 

Stability operations as an extracted resource

As part of an analysis of oil-rich states, Karl (Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz) posit that

They are ‘rentier states’ par excellence-states that rely to an unusually great extent on externally generated revenues.  This has two broad developmental effects.  On the one hand, the exceptional value of their leading commodity has meant unusually high levels of external intervention in shaping their affairs and capturing their resources by dominant states and foreign private interests.  On the other hand, petro-states are even less subject to the types of internal countervailing pressures that helped to produce bureaucratically efficacious, authoritative, liberal, and ultimately democratic states elsewhere precisely because they are relieved of the burden of having to tax their own subjects (Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz).  (Italics in the original)

Humphreys, et al. are speaking here of the affect of unexpectedly large revenues from extracted resources: specifically, the discovery of oil.  In the case of Afghanistan, the rents paid to the state take shape in the form of foreign aid.  The net effect is the same.  In fact, Coalition spending makes up the majority of Afghan revenues (Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction).

As noted earlier, corruption in Afghanistan actually mirrored the increase in Coalition spending and activity from 2007-2009.  Paul Collier[11] illustrates the phenomenon of the deleterious effects that occur when instable states discover previously hidden natural resources.  In speaking of a State Minister’s efforts to manage the sudden wealth that accrues from these large capital inputs, Collier says they (contracts for extracted resources) are ‘…good for the country, and quite often very good for the minister’ (Collier, TED).  Commonly referred to as Dutch Disease,[12] where sudden influxes of capital (not unlike Coalition spending in Afghanistan) follow a curve, with the first few years’ cash inputs are more beneficial, and the following years’ tend to consolidate in the hands of a few insiders.  The corollary to Diamond’s statement that ‘…when the elites are insulated from the consequences of those decisions, the elites are allowed to advance their own self-interests more easily’ is not lost on even the most casual of observers of events in Afghanistan.  In short, Afghanistan’s socio-political infrastructure pre-2001 could never have prepared it for the capital inputs it has received since.

Countries begin from different baselines.  In speaking of Dependency Theory (the Marxist cousin to CI) Theotonio Dos Santos posited that developed states prey on less-developed countries (LDCs) through resource extraction, hindering the ability of the LDC to develop any part of itself.  This is part and parcel of the dilemma:  in order to develop, LDCs must trade; because they are less developed, they first enter into trade from a position of relative weakness.  In Dos Santos’ view, exploitation of LDCs will continue into the distant future unless changes in the inequity of relative gains can be made (Ferraro).[13] Again we see the friction caused by deficient capacity assumptions with regard to stability operations in Afghanistan.  Our own (U.S. Army) doctrine cautions us thus:

…(The) challenges facing the commander in operations often can be understood only in the context of other factors influencing the population.  These other factors often include, but are not limited to, economic development, governance, information, tribal influence, religion, history and culture (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 3-4)

A fuller appreciation of CI theory provides a much better ‘structure’ on which to hang the ‘texture’ of lethal and non-lethal operations.  This increased appreciation could serve to better manage expectations, allowing practitioners and commanders to tailor their operations and, most importantly, their desired effects.[14]  Understanding that Coalition spending is analogous to an extracted resource, with its potential for fomenting a ‘resource curse’ condition, will better position decision makers in future stability operations.

Money as a Weapons System

“It is a simple question of policy,” said Nott.  “The country, whatever McNaghten[15] may think, is hostile, and we have to treat it as such.  We do this in three ways—through influence which Sujah[16] exerts on his unwilling subjects, which is little enough; through the force of our army here, which with respect is not as all-powerful as McNaghten imagines, since you’re outnumbered fifty to one by one of the fiercest warrior nations in the world; and thirdly, by buying the good will of important chiefs with money.  Am I right?” (Fraser)

At the writing of this paper the United States is spending over ten billion dollars a month in an attempt to drag Afghanistan out of its past and position it as a stable regional ally.  Nott, a character in Fraser’s work Flashman, lays bare the British position in Afghanistan at the time and accurately describes the pickle we are in now.  In Kabul, President Karzai rules his desk with an iron pen and our money.  His reach into the areas outside Kabul is as long as the series of zeros in his country’s checkbook.  Without incomes taxes, in an environment where even the various United States entities recognize the current value of functional corruption (citation), Karzai is hamstrung.  Even if he were the zealous reformer we wish he were, his ability to raise revenues is subject to constitutional limitation.  Further, neither the Provinces nor Districts (states and counties) have any constitutional authority to tax or spend.  Any revenues sent to Kabul (and they are few, mostly from recently transparentized border-revenue collection centers) are retained in Kabul at the disposal of the various Ministries.  Should a Province request money for projects or initiatives, they are long in coming if they come at all (citation needed).

Enter Money As A Weapons System, otherwise known as MAAWS.  As a construct, MAAWS evolved from the CERP program in Iraq in an effort to codify spending by ground commanders, aligning dollars spent with established LOEs and keeping commanders and money handlers from running afoul of DoD/USG contracting regulations.  The codification of MAAWS gave life to the program, as well as assigning it an acronymic, and mainstreamed it from its earlier humble beginnings as just one tool in a commander’s rucksack.  While USG spending in Afghanistan has unquestionably yielded positive results (citation/footnote needed), Afghanistan’s post-monarchical system of patronage coupled with a pervasive culture of functional corruption has skewed the local and national economy (citation needed) to the point of chronic dependency on external inputs of cash.  This dependency occurs between Kabul and its benefactors, Karzai and his Ministers and Provincial Governors, and Ministries and the supplicants for funds crying out for assistance in the districts.  

Functional corruption

He who creates a tyranny and does not kill Brutus, and he who establishes a free state and does not kill the sons of Brutus, will not last long.  (Machiavelli 196)

The sons of Brutus are everywhere.  They work in District Centers (the equivalent of a U.S. county courthouse), issuing identification cards; they wear uniforms, in the role of army recruit, border patroller or beat cop, paying back half their salary to their local commander in exchange for keeping their jobs; they drive trucks and lay bricks for U.S. construction projects.  On the best of days they come to work on time and interact with Coalition forces; on the worst of days, they watch as the convoy leaves, then follow our tracks to plant bombs for us to encounter the next day as we return to monitor their progress. 

Although in an environment such as this hard data on corruption are hard to come by and perhaps suspect, earning a ranking by Transparency International as just one notch above Somalia in the Corrupt Practices Index lends credence to this hypothesis (Transparency International).  Further, the effects of a landlocked and mountainous country continue to subject Afghanistan’s licit actors to the influences of their neighbors. 

Force and Reason

Landlocked, with low literacy rates, an oral tradition and weak media outlets with even weaker media market access; Afghans are particularly susceptible to messaging in all of its forms. Marshal McLuhan’s concept of ‘the medium as (sic) the message’ (McLuhan), in the aforementioned environment, is of particular import.   The Messenger, whether Imam, truck driver, expatriate worker or insurgent, is imbued with more credibility precisely due to the dearth of counter-messages. 

Pakistan’s proximity to Afghanistan coupled with its advance technical media outlets heavily influences Afghans.  Pakistan’s internal security and intelligence forces influence Afghanistan by force and reason: force, in supporting insurgent activities that are counter to the Afghan governments stated goals, and reason, when Pakistani media outlets and internal Afghan insurgent sympathizers engage neutral the neutral Afghan polity in dialogue against GIRoA.

Afghans are no different than people anywhere.  Afghans are influenced, coerced, and persuaded.  CI theory places a high value on the influence of neighboring states; in this case, Pakistan and India.  Pakistan influences Afghans directly, and Afghans are more susceptible to coercion and suasion from Pakistani economic, diplomatic and military actions than those of India.  India indirectly influences Afghans through its interactions with Pakistan and other extra-regional states when Pakistan’s efforts are driven by Indian politics.  In order for Pakistan to influence Afghan behavior three things must be present:  agency, authority and credibility.

Agency

Agents represent the authority of their higher-echelon handlers.  In the insurance industry, your ‘local agent’ represents a commercial underwriting company and, as such, is legally and fiducially empowered to obligate the company to agreements.  Insurance agents might have large, small or no office space.  They have communications abilities (phone, internet) and other resources at their disposal.  Military officers and non-commissioned officers are no different; both insurance agents and military officers are empowered to act legally and fiducially on behalf of their higher headquarters. Insurgents are no different (unless truly acting alone).  To have ‘teeth’, any agent must have been granted authority from a higher echelon.

Authority

Insurance companies, military chains of command and insurgent networks all have degrees of authority: either explicit, in the guise of uniforms and accoutrements, or implicit, such as respect for prior actions and personal relationships leading to trust between parties.  If an insurance agent or military officer misrepresents their higher echelon’s intent, consequences can follow.  If insurgents commit acts outside the scope of their handlers’ intent, those mistakes are punished.  If the agent, either selling insurance or ambushing convoys commits mistakes over time, the trend is noticed and the agent’s credibility is eroded.

Credibility

In the business world, breach of contract is perhaps the worst error in terms of trust.  In the socio-cultural world of tribal relations, trust is the lingua franca of licit and illicit acts.  Breach of contract is remedied through mediation; breach of insurgent operations can result in expulsion from the network, loss of income, and being ostracized from a group.  Arguably, credibility in the tribal networks crisscrossing the Afghan/Pakistan border is more valuable than money alone, as erosion of credibility can ultimately result in death. 

Pakistan’s role in harboring, guiding and outfitting insurgent networks as they relate to Afghanistan is no longer open to debate,[17] and is an example of the downside of Complex Interdependence.  Hard-power advocates (Realists) will point to this type of event and demand sanctions, increased transparency and other restrictive measures.  Complex Interdependence recognizes the need for less negative influence and addresses that need through more constructive engagement between Pakistan and Afghanistan, not Afghanistan and the U.S.  Everything from trade regulation and customs revenue to cultural and educational opportunities is part of the softer-side of CI here.  Pakistan’s proximity to Afghanistan is strongly reflected in media consumption, telephone traffic, cross-border trade, Afghan travel for Pakistani medical care and so on.  Failing to leverage Pakistan’s strong influence on Afghanistan is an error the U.S. can no longer afford to commit.  Under CI theory Pakistan should be fully leveraged in all these areas to affect a positive influence on Afghanistan.  We may not like how it turns out, but the alternative is the continued combustion of the tinder of the Afghan polity.

What is the role of promoting democracy in politically instable regions?

Although only one line of effort (LOE) among six, Governance is commonly assumed to manifest as the transparent democratic process.  Conventional wisdom with regard to stability operations holds that transparency engenders public trust in governance, leading to efficacy of service provision for an electorate.  Efforts supporting good governance, then, are those that support of the desire of the demos.  Effective measurement of the public’s (demos’) desire is reflected in voter turnout and solidification of electoral processes. 

The organizing principle here is the democratic process.  Inordinate and sometimes heroic efforts have been made in support of the democratic solution, yet statistics (International Institute for Democracy and Election Assistance) reflect a tepid response at best to democracy.  In speaking to the notion that democracy (as an exported product) is fallacious, Carothers parses the subject in fifths:

The Five Assumptions of Democratic Transition

1.     Any country moving away from dictatorial rule can be considered a country in transition toward democracy

2.     Democratization tends to unfold in a set sequence of stages

a.     The opening

b.     The breakthrough

c.     Consolidation

3.     The belief in the determinative importance of elections

4.     The underlying conditions in transitional countries-their economic level, political history, institutional legacies, ethnic makeup, socio-cultural traditions, or other ‘structural’ features-will not be major factors in either the onset or the outcome of the transition process

5.     That democratic transitions making up the ‘third wave’ (Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the New World Order) are being built on coherent, functioning states.  (Carothers 168-171)

With regard to Afghanistan and Iraq, these five statements are truly, as posited by Carothers, assumptions.  Definition of a viable end state in stability operations requires a clear understanding of the desire of the demos, if demos there may be.   Moving from ‘demos’ to ‘democratic process’ is to be seduced by a trick of grammar.  This seduction is amplified by one’s baseline: in the case of U.S. policy, democracy.  The validity of Carothers’ five arguments is more clearly realized when illustrated through his term, ‘assumption’. 

Assumption One

That “democracy is desirable” is as fallacious an argument as “onions are desirable”.  Anyone who has a child under the age of twenty can relate to the non-desirability of onions.  Children, given an option of onions or hot dogs, will choose hot dogs.  The onions come much later in life, and no amount of suasion will engender a genuine desire for onions. 

Democracy is no different:  it may be true that democracy is a higher form of governance than other types; it may be true that collective action by the demos will reduce and advance thorny issues; it may be true that the art of compromise is the surest way to advance agendas.  But:  in complex interdependence, agendas are many and varied; in complex interdependence, compromise depends on an organizing principle; in complex interdependence, issues are not organized in hierarchical fashion and, as such, compete for prominence in such a way as to sap the strength necessary to advance any of them.  Quite simply, democracy, like onions, is an acquired taste.

Assumption Two

Democracy is acquired in three stages:  the opening, the breakthrough, and consolidation.  U.S. history provides the casual observer with validation here.  Democracy took root in the post-Columbus environment, enabling the independence and maturation of the modern United States.  On further examination, democracy in the pre-United States occurred in the glaring absence of any opposition:  Britain was an ocean away and the Native Americans were practically exterminated in the name of Manifest Destiny.[18] Further, the level of voter fraud in Afghanistan skews the data set so as to render it non-viable.[19] 

There has been no ‘breakthrough’ in Afghanistan with regard to democracy.  Small gains are reported and not without evidence. To be sure, democratic processes are far more robust in 2011 than in 2001, but corruption and voter fraud at all levels put the process into question.[20]  More accurately in Afghanistan ‘breakthrough’ was passed over and the polity moved closer to ‘consolidation’.  Any gains made in that ten-year period are spurious and temporary, dependant on significant external inputs and oversight.  Only time will tell if democracy roots into the soil there, further strengthening the systems and processes begun in earnest at the start of the decade.  Serious attention to these systems and processes, along with continued external support, may give democracy a chance. 

Assumption Three

The occurrence of elections is proof of the democratic concept.  Supporters of this assumption point to process participation.  As a metric, voter turnout is tangible:  of a given population, a certain percentage voted.  If we pursue this line of reasoning, we could assign a value to each percentage point, with zero signifying absence of democracy and one hundred (percent voter turnout) being complete democracy.  In modern terms, then, the United States would be only slightly more “democratic” than Switzerland and only half as democratic as Afghanistan.  Australia would be almost completely democratic, owing to the fact that the democratically elected government of Australia requires voter participation by law (Hill and Louth).

Assumption Four

To hold that

…the underlying conditions in transitional countries-their economic level, political history, institutional legacies, ethnic makeup, socio-cultural traditions, or other ‘structural’ features-will not be major factors in either the onset or the outcome of the transition process (Carothers)

…is to believe that a fractured and fractious electorate, suffering from the lack of the many benefits of democracy will somehow coalesce into a unified, compromise-seeking entity striving for a common good while putting aside their own individual identities. In truth, these weak systems, lacking a long period of incremental movement away from autocracy and towards democracy have little chance of achieving functional democratic maturity.

Assumption Five

The experience of the purveyors of democracy in the Western hemisphere assumes a baseline of governance that is receptive to being taken to the next step: democracy.  Iconoclasts such as Morales in Bolivia and Chavez in Venezuela have successfully challenged this notion.  Other Western (democratic) strictures put democracy to the test with mixed results.  World Bank funds are dependent on the requisite straightjacket of public fiscal behavior (Friedman) and challenge the most resilient of democratic systems.  The fickle nature of economics in a globalized market punishes licit governments when public policy fails to keep pace with economic reality.  The urge, then, to protect the demos from increasingly unsupportable rates of change is great (see: Argentina, Bolivia, Russia, Myanmar, Venezuela, et al.). 

Without a period of democratic experimentation spanning generations, the validity of democracy is open to revisionist questioning.  External pressures, be they economic, diplomatic or military, easily call a weak system into question.  That the demos seek a protector from the democratic nature of modern economics is telling, at times delivering a Pyrrhic victory in the form of a return to more centralized forms of governance.  Putin’s continued popularity in Russia is modern proof of this revisionist tendency.  Russia, Argentina, Bolivia and Venezuela all cast doubt on the notion that democratic governance will take firm root in the soil of ‘coherent, functioning states’ (Ibid). [21]

The expectation that a), there is a demos, b), the demos will coalesce and c), man’s baser needs will take a back seat to higher political goals is too much in many cases.  To continue moving towards the goal of democracy in these unready regions is to display a blissful ignorance of history and to cling to the idea that expenditure of the right amounts of blood and treasure will induce behavioral change, and negation of the various established individual needs.  In the words of one Afghan translator working with coalition forces, ‘you cannot win a war by spending money’.[22]

Carothers’ observations ring harsh but true:  adoption of and adaptation to the democratic model of governance rest on five fragile assumptions.  Close examination of these five assumptions reveals that fragility to be dependent on factors not yet present in Afghanistan.

Adherents to the promotion of democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq point to the levels of Maslow’s pyramid.  Themistocles’ fiddlers at all levels intone policy and conduct operations focusing on security, all the time unaware that the tip of one man’s pyramid is not the same as the tip of another’s.  Self-actualization is a moving target, based on a plethora of variable conditions no organization can hope to set.  Indeed, recent trends in governance reflect the interdependent nature of a more fully globalized world in a pull away from the democratic model:

In the West and in the Americas we thus seem to face a choice between a flawed free-market American model (of economic life) and a good old European one, warts and all.  Today, Europe looks a bit more attractive to many.  But to many more around the world, authoritarian statism looks ever more appealing.  (Orenstein)

The concept of the battle space owner in Afghanistan (U.S. military forces) being simultaneously responsible for security, governance, and development is a stretch and forces the military into a role it is ill-prepared to assume.  From the point of view of the Afghan polity, the ‘board of directors’ concept (U.S. Department of State) is as transparent as Afghan elections:  everyone knows who is cheating, and no one can do anything about it.  While U.S. military forces are not cheating, per se, they are indeed placed in a position not unlike a traditional Afghan warlord. 

Theoretically placed on equal terms with both the U.S. Department of State and Afghan government representatives, battle space owners continue to be the primary source of action, results, and blame.  Holding primary accountability, along with holding the majority of lethal force and critical transportation assets puts U.S. commanders in the same position as an Afghan warlord.  The Golden Rule is just as applicable in Afghanistan as anywhere else:  he who has the gold (and guns) makes the rules.  As long as the Afghans see a weak institution (GIRoA) propped up via American forces, they will look to U.S. forces for decisions.

How can interagency and coalition actors responsibly disengage from stability operations?

The military alone cannot solve all the problems faced in this environment.  Unified action-involving joint and multinational forces, and interagency, nongovernmental, and intergovernmental organizations-now reaches to the tactical level (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 1-2)

Given current doctrine (above) perhaps the real question is ‘Should we (Coalition) disengage from stability operations’.  Stability operations were officially added to the DoD mission set only recently (need footnote/citation here).  Leaving the doctrinal decision for later discussion, we return to the current issue:  how to responsibly disengage under the extant condition set.

CI theory and DoD doctrine actually are in harmony here:  CI theory says decreasing military action encourages local cooperation, and DoD doctrine recognizes the criticality of joint, multinational and interagency efforts.  Supporters of the current tranche of ‘failure narratives’ regarding Iraq and Afghanistan will be disappointed here:  DoD is attempting to do the right thing under very difficult conditions.  To paraphrase Winston Churchill, U.S. DoD is the worst entity currently doing stability operations, except for all the others. 

Given a shortened time horizon (anticipated significant DoD draw-downs in Afghanistan by 2014) and the tightening of extra-budget funding for operations, the solution will reveal itself.  The most likely scenario is a tacit embrace of the tenets of CI theory (though most will not recognize the connection of tactics and strategy to theory, but never mind), forcing increased regional cooperation, with a focus on Pakistan as it relates to Afghan politics.  Between then and now, perhaps the most critical operation is to recognize what we are all doing in stability operations and further sharpen the theoretical focus so as to improve doctrine going forward.

Transitional challenges:  harmonizing military and political efforts towards responsible disengagement.

Rumors of effects-based operation’s (EBO) demise are premature.  Although GEN Mattis’ memorandum (ibid) has slowed the accretion of EBO into the staff officers’ lexicon, the ‘effect’ of effects based thinking on operations in the Army has taken root.  Railing against the ‘long assessment cycle’, Mattis goes on to say that ‘…system of systems analysis has (sic) not delivered on their (sic) benefits’. 

Why discuss the demise of EBO in a paper on CI theory?  Simply put, to use Mattis’ own words, ‘…we will continue to emphasize the art of command, the importance of collaborative proactive action with interagency and multinational partners, and comprehensive whole-of-government approaches to achieving our objectives’.  Certainly we can agree with this last statement, in terms of harmonizing military and political efforts in stability operations. 

Redundancies notwithstanding, ‘proactive action’ must have a purpose.  Whether that purpose is defined as an end state, intent or effect, any effort focused on stability operations must recognize the import of systems analysis.  The interconnected nature of multiple (non-lethal) actors, differing agendas and (to the dismay of military planners everywhere) the absence of a hierarchy demand a renewed focus on System of Systems Analysis (SoSA). 

There is no question that military planning processes and problem-solving doctrine (the military decision making process, MDMP)[23] reaches an objective.  The problem is that in the messy CI world (where folks don’t always play ball), the most desirable ‘objective’ is usually better defined as a ‘condition’.  In no way am I suggesting here that doctrinal planning processes be abandoned; rather, abandoning SoSA and EBO completely, as GEN Mattis instructed in 2008, precludes operations personnel from considering the effect of military operations on systems other than those in the cross-hairs.

Harmonizing military and political efforts in stability operations requires more than a dismissal of a concept based on one documented bad experience[24] or, to put it more simply, because it’s too hard.  If the United States continues to put the DoD into the role of conducting stability operations, all the stakeholders should have a voice.  Here, then, is the heart of harmony:  giving voice to the voiceless. 

When DoD, with its assets and checkbook is in the lead role, whether by design or chance, the voiceless are at a distinct disadvantage.  One way towards harmonizing the cacophony of dissonance is to truly place other agencies on a more equal footing with DoD actors.  Although anathema to Unity of Command,[25] stability operations in a CI environment demand a broader ‘ear’ and a more fully empowered board of directors who are co-equal at the table.  Perhaps harmonization means a complete re-thinking of the military’s role in stability operations; more of ‘enabler’ than ‘actor of first resort’,[26] for as long as the ratio of DoD to DoS remains skewed (DoD:DoS in Afghanistan is approximately 130:1) the resources and efforts will remain equally skewed in favor of the DoD. 

Of course, harmonization of DoD, interagency and multinational actors requires more than a tailoring of our lexicon or a broadening of our doctrine.  To responsibly disengage means, quite simply, to leave Afghanistan better off than when we began in 2001, and the region more able to conduct it’s affairs without negatively impacting international actors.  CI theory supports harmonization by recognizing the importance of entities other than DoD/DoS, and allowing for the increased activity and natural progression of the acts of local and regional participants.  

Can a ‘cooperative region’ be developed through external efforts or must it occur naturally?

From a historical point of view, all end-states fixed in time were arrived at naturally: the fall of the Berlin Wall was a function of all activities preceding it, the Soviet involvement in Cuba was a function of all preceding events, and so on.  Although these historical end-states were a function of their aggregate inputs, they were also a function of conditions more or less organic and sustainable, until those inputs were withdrawn.  Cuba served as a proxy to a much larger political struggle and received external inputs as long as it served those interests; when the dénouement came to pass, the external inputs changed, changing the local and regional dynamic.  Likewise Berlin’s role in international politics was forever altered by the removal of critical external attentions.  ‘Naturally’ occurring inputs are more aptly described as renewable and sustainable.  The removal of external assistance, whether it be money for aid programs or fertilizer for increased crop yields returns the system to the status quo ante.

For a region to enter into cooperative and mutually beneficial agreements, there must be some level of internal (state) trust in the external (regional) level of commitment over time.  Here is the rub:  people and states are not stupid.  Temporary external inputs, whether economic, military, diplomatic or some other form, are known by all to be just that: temporary.  Further, there is a general expectation of quid pro quo that no amount of pandering can mitigate.  Public trust in extra-regional support is as fickle as the extra-regional players’ agenda:  there is no such thing as a free lunch and everyone knows it.

Successful, enduring systems arrive at that status through natural progression and are self-sustaining.  Neighboring states, with the myriad of cross-border trade interests, common languages, cultural and religious affinities are vested in the successful outcome of regional cooperation.  Extra-regional actors can never achieve the same level of intrinsic trust as inter-regional actors, and will always be seen as suspect by an increasingly well-informed polity.  No amount of diplomatic suasion can affect internal change at the individual level: people are too smart.  Our greatest policy victory would be to recognize that only through a natural progression of internal struggle will the hearts and minds of voters half a world away be really and truly changed. 

Summary

Operations in Afghanistan are subject to the same friction of competing agendas, lack of overarching hierarchical principals, and the un-natural presence of a large military force.  Complex Interdependence theory is not Realism in the strictest sense, nor is it merely recognition of the obvious.  Appreciating stability operations and transition in Afghanistan is enhanced through an understanding of CI theory.  As in any twelve-step addiction program, U.S. policymakers and doctrinal adherents need to move from denial to acceptance, from co-dependence to inter-dependence.  Accepting that the deleterious effect of foreign military presence on desired outcomes in Afghanistan prohibits natural democratic progression is a start.  Realizing that rational expectations are Afghan/internal/regional instead of U.S./external is a solid next step.  History shows us that setting conditions for democracy best occurs in the absence of denial and co-dependence, and takes a longer time to accomplish in the presence of outside forces that interfere with the give and take of internal struggles leading to a solid, sustainable and harmonious political outcome. 

CI theory requires harmonizing responsible engagement with some actors, and disengagement with others.  This is easier said than done, and requires a force of character and strength of will on the part of some actors, while others may be asked to play a lesser role.  Unpalatable as it may be to some, military operations in Afghanistan are creating dissonance.  To paraphrase Keohane and Nye:  If complex interdependence causes a reduction in military force by governments towards other governments within the region (of cooperation), or on the issues, will military presence by outside actors prolong instability?  The short answer is yes. 

Conclusion

Complex Interdependence theory is not just a lens through which to view the current problem of COIN in Afghanistan; it is systems analysis at the macro-level in every sense: diplomatic, informational, military and economic.  The U.S. military, under the acronym SOSA (System of Systems Analysis) poked its nose under the tent of International Relations theory and is shouldering under the canvas.  The recent addition of Stability Operations as a core function of the Joint Chiefs represents the camel creeping fully into the big tent of IR theory.  Getting COIN right requires rigorous academic training in the science of analysis and the art of suasion and a patience of effort for which the modern voting public has very little stomach.  A major part of patience of effort in Afghanistan rests with the military’s stepping away from the quest for total operational control and information dominance: the U.S. military needs to include the relinquishment of control as a metric, be at peace with less-than optimal end states, and reward commanders on the ground as they reduce their efforts as Afghan forces take over. A complete revision of the current Lines of Effort[27] and a clear-eyed look at the real effect of MAAWS’ tendency to create unsustainable dependencies in Afghanistan would contribute tangibly to getting COIN right as we move forward.

The minor role of military force as the acme of success in stability operations is violated daily in Afghanistan.  Adhering to outdated treaties, practitioners of stability operations appear as military actors: uniformed, armed and restricted by force protection measures that severely limit freedom of movement and act as a barrier between provider and customer.

Competing needs, absent a coherent hierarchy, and absent any agreed-upon supra-statal organizing principles, will act on the military stability provider as ‘death by a thousand cuts’, leading not to positive closure for all parties but, far more likely, a compromise of principles over time leading to far less end-state improvement than was ever imagined.  Structured organizations, military and civilian alike, are involved in an asymmetric organizational struggle with regard to Complex Interdependence.  Non-military actors, Afghan and regional, must be allowed to find their own way, within certain limits and under the eye of an empowered but non-interventionist organization.

Responsible disengagement in Afghanistan requires the harmonization of competing agendas, a reduction of external military influence, and increased inputs from neighborhood states.  Focusing interagency transitional energies to create these conditions will improve conditions in Afghanistan and contribute to regional stability.  Keohane and Nye’s theory of Complex Interdependence illuminates our path; it remains up to all of us to follow it.  

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The term “battle space owner” has set the wrong conditions and expectations in Stability Operations. 

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[1] The majority of the work in the following section is taken directly from Diamond’s talk on www.ted.com.

[2] In fact: ‘Currently, weak revenue collection prolongs Afghan dependence on donors.  Collected revenues cover only one-third of the core budget.’ Ronna Afghan Web, "Afghanistan's National Budget," 2010, 21 December 2010 <https://ronna-afghan.harmonieweb.org/.../Afghanistan%20National%20Budget.doc>.

[3] Coalition lines of effort (LOEs) in Afghanistan as of May 2011:  Governance, development, information operations, security, agriculture, and negative influencers.  LOE’s are prioritized differently for different operational units; for example, a battle space owners’ highest priority might be security, while a Provincial Reconstruction Team will take the lead on governance and development.

[4] Formalized early in the U.S. involvement in Iraq, CERP provides cash to U.S. ground forces commanders to support five of the six lines of effort: governance, development, negative influencers (bad actors), information operations, and agriculture.  The sixth, security, is not within the scope of CERP.

[5] For an excellent treatise on power politics see John Mearsheimer’s book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001).

[6] With apologies to Donald Rumsfeld.

[7] ‘As of April 1, 2010, U.S. civilian presence in the field outside of Kabul has more than quadrupled, from 67 to over 350’. U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan , Periodic, United States Congress (Washington: US GPO, 210).

[8] For a cogent discussion of what stability operations could be, see Thomas Barnett, www.ted.com, June 2007, 1 November 2009 <http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/thomas_barnett_draws_a_new_map_for_peace.html>.

[9] As of 01MAY2011, the obligation of funds under CERP in Afghanistan was stopped, awaiting Congress’ passage of the budget continuation act.

[10] The ratio of DoS staffers to Afghans as of April 2010 was 0.35:29,000.  The same ratio of DoS staffers in Paris to total Frenchmen was 1.060:66,000, making France the better ratio of DoS staffers (data extrapolated from www.dos.gov, based on 53 offices in France with an estimated average of 10 staffers per office.  The number is likely far higher.

[11] Taken together, Collier’s two latest books are indispensable in gaining a greater understanding of the net negative effect of large capital inputs on instable states. Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), Paul Collier, Wars, Guns and Votes (New York: Harper Collins, 2009).  Collier is the former Chief Economist at the International Monetary Fund.

[12] After the discovery of oil in the North Sea, the Dutch economy spiked for the years immediately following the discovery, and then fell for many more years as a result of an initial increase of dependence on the oil revenues. 

[13] See also Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," in K.T. Fann and Donald C. Hodges, eds., Readings in U.S. Imperialism. Boston: Porter Sargent, 1971, p. 226

[14] Although ‘killed’ by GEN (USMC) Mattis, the U.S. Army has retained the best parts of Effects-Based Operations (EBO).  J.N. Mattis, Assessment of Effects Based Operations, Memorandum, U.S. Department of Defense (Norfolk: Joint Forces Command, 2008).

[15] Sir William McNaghten, Envoy of the British government to Kabul.  He held the equivalent rank of ambassador.

[16] Shaw Sujah, Afghan political leader of the time.  He took control of Kabul on August 7^th, 1839, with the help of the British army.

[17] All pretense of ‘nice’ behavior was washed away with the killing of Osama Bin Laden under the nose of the ISI earlier this year.

[18] In recollecting his time as President, Harry Truman spoke of the damage done to the American Indian: “We murdered as many as we could, and took their land away from them. I have always felt that the Indians should have been allowed to maintain themselves on the lands and improve their position, and eventually they would have become friendly to us.  They have the same sort of brains and body as we have, and they are a brave people”. Harry S. Truman, Mr. Citizen (New York: Bernard Geis Associates, 1960). 

[19] Begun in 2007, Transparency International’s Corrupt Practices Index ranked Afghanistan as follows: 2007:172/178; 2008: 176/179; 2009:179/180; 2010: 176/180. Transparency International, "2009 Global Corruption Barometer," 2009, Publications, 30 June 2009 <http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/gcb2009>.

[20] In the last election, Terezayi district, with a population of roughly 150,000 inhabitants, twelve votes were cast (author’s personal observation).

[21] A recent news item lays bare the myth of the rising capitalist tide in Russia.  In speaking of a recent trip to Moscow after a fifteen-year absence, Rupert Wingfield Hayes compares: ‘…(I)nstead, Russia has remained sullen and hostile, and re-embraced autocratic leadership in the shape of Vladimir Putin-and we wonder why.  What you realize, when you live in Russia, is that so many of our assumptions are wrong.  While we were celebrating Russia’s release from Bolshevik tyranny, most Russians were being plunged into poverty, unemployment and misery, as unbridled capitalism was let loose upon an unprepared populace. Rupert Wingfield Hayes, "BBC News," 11 November 2010, Capitalism's tough reality for many Russians, 11 November 2010 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/h/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/9184718.stm>. Author’s italics.

[22] Personal comment to the author by Afghan interpreter ‘Ras’, 10 May 2011 on the occasion of an IED fatality, Chergotah village, Terezayi District, Khost, Afghanistan.

[23] The MDMP has six parts and seventeen steps in one abbreviated version.

[24] Mattis cites Israeli General Avi Kovar’s bad experience based on an over-reliance on the concept of EBO during the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli Conflict.

[25] One of the Nine Principles of War first articulated by Clausewitz.

[26] For a thorough and prescient look forward in the timeline of U.S. stability operations structure, see (Barnett Pentagon’s New Map citation needed).

[27] LOE’s were indeed revised during the writing of this paper, May, 2011.